Continuity despite crises: Germany's euro policy in the light of the pandemic, war and inflation

After a decade of reforming and stabilising the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it has been put to a triple test: the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the return of inflation have posed serious challenges to the eurozone that call for policy responses. Against the background of recent advances in European integration theory, we assess whether and how these challenges have led to a change in the EMU policy of the eurozone's most powerful member, Germany. We conceptualise three ideal-typical policy options for Germany to deal with EMU's challenges and we search for traces of policy learning from past eurozone crisis management. On the basis of semi-structured interviews with German political elites, we cannot identify any significant change in Germany's EMU policy. We conclude that the unwavering continuity of Germany's euro policy makes further substantial integration in EMU unlikely. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Journal of European Public Policy is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

Centrifugal forces in a hegemonic environment: the rise of small-state coalitions in the Economic and Monetary Union

A hegemonic power can guarantee the status quo in an international economic system. However, domestic or international changes may unsettle a hegemon’s priorities. In such phases, smaller states benefiting from the existing system may fear that the hegemon will fail to keep the system stable. How do they react if they lose trust in the hegemon’s ability or will to maintain the status quo? This article argues that in such cases, free riding becomes less rewarding. Therefore, smaller states build publicly visible coalitions to ‘voice’ their preferences. Applying this argument to the role of small ‘creditor states’ in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the article draws on original in-depth interviews to analyze the ‘New Hanseatic League’ as a strategy to defend the present euro regime and counterbalance the Franco–German tandem. By elaborating and tracing a fine-grained causal mechanism, the article thus explains the emergence of vocal small-state coalitions in a hegemonic environment.